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Clarke: Finding a Remedy and Respect in Equity: Traditional Knowledge, In

FINDING A REMEDY AND RESPECT IN
EQUITY:
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, INVENTORSHIP,
AND PERSEPTIVE BIOSYSTEMS V. PHARMA CIA
BIOTECH
I. INTRODUCTION
In the foreground, a blond, freckled, bespectacled
"gringo," suited from head to toe in adventure
khaki, visibly sporting no less than five cargo
pockets, leans over a bright green leaf. "So this
And how is it
plant cures stomachaches?
prepared?" asks the gringo.

Juan, a dark skinned and colorfully dressed native,
clearly at home amidst the lush foliage surrounding
him, answers, "[s]imple... you dry it out well, and
then. . ."

From beyond the picture comes a shout, "Hold on,
Juan!!!"

Confused, Juan turns to his friend, "What's up,
Maria?"

"Be careful what you say. . ." Maria cautions.

So begins the "How to Protect Our Collective Knowledge"
graphic pamphlet created by INDECOPI, the intellectual property
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ministry of Peru.' Designed to be distributed to indigenous
peoples in Peru, the pamphlet goes on to suggest that the
indigenous community hold its traditions close until a community
assembly agrees to let the "gringo"2 sign a contract detailing his
rights and responsibilities with regard to the community's
knowledge.3 Following contract approval by the ministry, the
outsider is free to conduct studies on the plant, eventually
developing his findings into a commercially viable product that
funds a medical clinic in Juan and Maria's community.' This ideal
arrangement described by INDECOPI ensures that the community
receives adequate compensation for the knowledge that belongs to
everyone in it, from the grandparents to the grandchildren.'
The problem INDECOPI hopes to stem through its pamphlet,
the lack of adequate compensation for traditional knowledge, is
neither new nor specific to Peru. Rather, it speaks to a struggle
that has been ongoing for over a generation now, pitting the Global
North-industrialized countries with strong intellectual property
laws-against the Global South-developing nations rich in
biodiversity and traditional cultural knowledge.' Although the
conflict exists in several fora, the most prominent venue for debate
is in patent law.' By and large, developing countries believe that
1. Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protecci6n de la
Propiedad Intelectual [National Institute for the Defense of Competition and
Intellectual Property Protection] [INDECOPI], i C6mo Proteger Nuestros
Conocimientos Colectivos? [How to Protect our Collective Knowledge], at 1-2
(2006) [hereinafter INDECOPI Pamphlet] (on file with author).
2. The term "gringo" is used by the natives depicted in the pamphlet-and by
persons in Peru and surrounding countries-as a moniker for non-LatinAmericans, particularly blond Caucasian non-Latin-Americans. Id. at 7; see
also DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAfJOLA (Real Academia Espafiola, 22nd
ed. 2001), available at http://buscon.rae.es/drael/ (defining "gringo" as a fair
skinned blond haired foreigner).
3. INDECOPI Pamphlet, supra note 1, at 3-7.
4. Id. at 13-14.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 547, 548-50 (2003).
7. See Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition
Agreements as a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign
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indigenous cultures deserve to be compensated for their
contributions to patented innovations.' In the developed world,
however, rigid and technical inventorship standards make it nearly
impossible for indigenous communities to directly obtain patent
protection. 9 Moreover, the costs inherent in either obtaining
exclusive property rights over indigenous knowledge or preventing
others from holding such rights often present a hurdle too high for
indigenous communities to clear."o
Thus, an international discourse, broadly described in section II
A of this Note, continues to unfold regarding the current and future
status of traditional knowledge in patent law regimes. Section II B
focuses on the patent law under which inventions are protected in
the United States, with a particular focus on the statutory laws and
equitable requirements relating to inventorship itself. The Note
goes on in Section III to discuss the Federal Circuit's opinion in
PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharnacia Biotech, Inc." which
declared several patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct
Traditional Knowledge in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 629, 630-31
(2007) (enumerating instances of misappropriated traditional knowledge, most
of which include the granting of patents); Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore, Patent System and the Fight Against Biopiracy - The Peruvian
Experience, Eighth Session, Geneva, June 6-10, 2005, paras. 1-3, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/12 (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter Peruvian Biopiracy
Experience] (detailing Peru's establishment of a National Anti-Biopiracy
Commission to investigate patents on traditional knowledge).
8. STEPHEN HANSEN & JUSTIN VANFLEET, AM. Ass'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF SCIENCE [AAAS], TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
A HANDBOOK ON ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
HOLDERS IN PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MAINTAINING
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 5 (2003), availableat http://shr.aaas.org/tek/handbook/.

9. Rebecca M. Bratspies, The New Discovery Doctrine: Some Thoughts on
Property Rights and TraditionalKnowledge, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 315, 335
(2006/2007).
10. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Analysis of
Options for Implementing Disclosure of Origin Requirements in Intellectual
Property Applications, para. 49, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2004/14
(Feb. 15, 2006) (prepared by Joshua D. Sarnoff & Carlos M. Correa)
[hereinafter UNCTAD Disclosure Analysis].
11. 225 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000) [hereinafter PerSeptive IV] (reh'gdenied,
reh'g en banc denied, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31908 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 22, 2000)).
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surrounding inventorship without giving effect to statutory
inventorship laws. The case was driven heavily by a recitation of
facts that, though not always apropos to the legal issues of
inventorship before it, detailed a series of falsehoods and
omissions on the part of the named inventors regarding the
contributions of individuals unnamed (and potentially unnamable)
as inventors.12 PerSeptive may provide an arrow, albeit a rather
flimsy one, to add to the quiver of biopiracy opponents. Section
IV considers the court's reasoning and its ramifications regarding
disputes over the role of traditional knowledge. Ultimately, this
Note finds support for integrating more formal traditional
knowledge disclosure requirements into United States patent law.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Indigenous Contributionsand Compensation
According to many nations and academic observers, the current
scope of intellectual property law does not adequately account for
the wealth of biological and cultural resources flowing from
biodiverse developing nations into the industrialized world."
These critics point out that indigenous communities who often
give researchers the leads necessary to identify and "invent"
patentable subject matter relating to the communities indigenous
genetic resources are seldom compensated for their intellectual
contributions. 4 Thousands of years of cultural development, not
12. Kuruk, supra note 7, at 632 ("Under these circumstances, it becomes
critically important to determine the avenues for redress available in the
American legal system to the foreign rights holders or custodians of such
knowledge.").
13. See, e.g., Peruvian Biopiracy Experience, supra note 7, paras.1-3;
VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 69-79
(1997). But see HANSEN & VANFLEET, supra note 8, at 5 (suggesting that an
understanding of extant intellectual property law offers traditional knowledge
holders some protection).
14. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic
Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without
Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U.
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necessarily recorded, may be necessary to identify and cultivate
useful plants and treatments. Yet any resulting development has
been defined as within the international public domain and,
accordingly, is freely available to those in developed countries,
countries with strong patent systems, to base their patents upon.15
Some argue that patents related to traditional uses of indigenous
resources can add equity to indigenous communities by creating
new markets for their resources in the developed world.16 Others
believe that patents, and benefits resulting from the exclusive
property right, are best characterized as "biopiracy" if the profits
are not divided equitably with, or obtained under the authority of,
indigenous communities." As one commentator suggested, "[i]f
the infringement of patents . . . constitutes intellectual piracy, then

so does the failure to recognize and compensate indigenous and
traditional peoples for the creations arising from their
knowledge.""
The terminology itself is often subject to debate-what one calls
biopiracy, invoking a range of negative connotations, another may
characterize in a positive light as bioprospecting." One of this
J.L. & POL'Y 371, 375 (2000).

15. Bratspies, supra note 9, at 335; Javier Garcia, Fighting Biopiracy. The
Legislative Protectionof TraditionalKnowledge, 18 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 5,
5-6 (2007);see also Jim Chen, There's No Such Thing as Biopiracy ... and It's a
Good Thing Too, 37 MCGEORGE L. REv. 1, 24 (2006) (stating that the free
availability of ethnobiological knowledge is a positive from a utilitarian
perspective).
16. See Hugh R. Morley, Battle over a perk-me-up; Peru seeks to overturn
N.J company's patent, THE RECORD, (Hackensack, N.J.), March 4, 2004, at BI
(discussing and quoting the named inventor on a patent alleged to be based on
traditional knowledge: "'[W]e really enhanced the equity of maca itself,' he
said. 'Maca has become a much bigger cash crop for the Peruvian people....
We shouldn't be blamed; we should be thanked."').
17. See UNCTAD Disclosure Analysis, supra note 10, para. 35 ("Biopiracy
may be defined as the effect of obtaining access to genetic resources without
appropriate authority. It also may be defined more broadly to involve
unauthorized commercialization resulting from access, derivation of unjustified
benefits, or failure to provide for equitable benefit-sharing.").
18. IKECHI MGBEOJI,
INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE

19. Andres
CONFRONTING

GLOBAL

BIOPIRACY:

PATENTS,

PLANTS

AND

12 (2006).
Barreda, Biopiracy, Bioprospecting, and Resistance, in
GLOBALIZATION:
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Note's key terms, however, is subject to less polarized dispute:
"traditional knowledge" is generally accepted to refer to the
information developed by a community over time through
experience interacting with its environment, particularly with the
biological resources in that environment.2 0 Although traditional
knowledge may descend from generations past, communities
continually create innovative uses of the natural resources that
surround them: their knowledge is "traditional" only in the manner
in which it is accumulated and passed on; the term does not
necessarily imply that the knowledge is old.2'
Traditional
knowledge is seldom written down, nor does it emerge from the
"flash of creative genius" of a single individual.22 Rather, the
information is inherently cumulative, building upon the collective
efforts of an entire community. 23
The value of traditional knowledge to the industrial world is not
disputed.2 4 Perhaps the most salient example of its worth is "the
ethnobotanical approach to drug discovery-the use of
[indigenous] people's knowledge and experiences of the medicinal
properties of plants and other genetic resources to guide drug
discovery-[which] has yielded most of the plant based
pharmaceuticals in use today." 25 In spite of a clear opportunity for
114-21 (Wise et al. eds. 2003) (describing popular
resistance to government approved, undisclosed bioprospecting agreements).
20. HANSEN & VANFLEET, supra note 8, at 3; accord UNCTAD Disclosure
Analysis, supra note 10, paras. 36-39; World Intellectual Property Organization,
Intellectual Property and TraditionalKnowledge: Booklet No. 2, at 4-6, WIPO
Pub. No. 920(E) (2009).
21. Id; MGBEOJI, supranote 18, at 9-11 (2006).
22. Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of TraditionalKnowledge, 33
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 233, 240-43 (2001). The phrase "flash of creative
genius" refers to a test once used by the Supreme Court to characterize a nonobvious innovation. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S.
84, 90-91 (1941).
See also Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of
Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 319, 327-30 (2008) (suggesting
that our patent model is premised on a narrative myth that conflates inventive
acts with American ideals like rugged individualism and, consequently, enjoys a
false sense of legitimacy).
23. Dutfield, supra note 22, at 240-43.
24. See Chen, supra note 15, at 7; Garcia, supra note 15, at 5.
25. SARAH A. LAIRD & KERRY TEN KATE, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF
RESISTANCE IN MEXICO,
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symbiotic exchange, agreements between drug developers and the
ostensible sources of their knowledge, agreements that would
allocate a portion of benefits from drug discoveries, patents, and
commercialization to traditional knowledge providers, are few and
far between.26 Patents have been issued and profits have been
reaped around the globe for both non-inventive step improvements
on traditional knowledge and exact replications of traditional uses
of indigenous resources; substantive involvement of, or benefit
sharing with, the traditional knowledge developers has been
lacking.2 7 According to some, the likeliest cure for any apparent
injustice lies in individual contractual agreements that would allow
a party seeking to exploit traditional knowledge the chance to

61
(1999).
26. Id, accordde Carvalho, supra note 14, at 375. The system established by
INDECOPI, pursuant to Peruvian Law 27811, is not fully established and has
yet to yield a contract. Ley No. 27811, Ley Que Establece el Regimen de
Proteccion de los Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos Indigenas
Vinculados a los Recursos Biol6gicos [Regimen for Protecting Collective
Knowledge and Associated Biological Resources], El Peruano, 10 Aug. 2002
(Peru); Sara Quinteros, Representative of INDECOPI, Remarks at the Peruvian
Congressional Workshop on Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge:
Protection of Traditional Knowledge (July 8, 2010). Another notable venture,
the International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups ("ICBG") Program, seeks to
recognize and compensate the contributions of traditional knowledge holders
and, though it named indigenous inventors on at least one provisional patent
applications, no patents were ultimately issued naming indigenous contributors
as co-inventors. McManis, supra note 6, at 565-70; see, e.g., USPTO database
search for "Aguaruna," http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2010) (yielding no patents recognizing Aguaruna
inventive contributions)add parenthetical explaining significance)
27. SHIVA, supra note 13, at 69-79; Laura Carlsen, Biopiracy on the Border,
BIODIVERSITY: ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND BENEFIT-SHARING

in CONFRONTING GLOBALIZATION: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND POPULAR
RESISTANCE IN MEXICO, 83 (Wise et al. eds. 2003) (discussing the Enola bean
patent's effect on the market for Mexican exporters); Submission by Brazil,

Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Thailand, Peru and
Venezuela to the TRIPs Council, The RelationshipBetween the Trips Agreement
and the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge, para. 4, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/403 (June 24, 2003) [hereinafter
Biodiverse Nations' TK WIPO Submission] (referring to quinoa and ayahuasca

patents).
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negotiate terms of benefit sharing with knowledge providers.2 8
These commonly proposed benefit sharing agreements might not
be necessary if the contributions of indigenous cultures were
recognized under established intellectual property law.29 However,
today's intellectual property regime, particularly within the United
States, has little room to recognize whole traditional communities
as bona fide inventors entitled to patent protection even if the
communities do develop useful traditional cures, medicines, and
foods." In a just world order, critics assert, this cannot stand:
these contributions to human knowledge, particularly in inventive
endeavors, must be recognized and respected within states'
intellectual property regimes.
As detailed below, technical and statutory barriers can prevent
many traditional knowledge holders from obtaining patent

28. Barreda, supra note 19, at 105-07; McManis, supra note 6, at 559.
29. Jacques de Werra, Fighting Against Biopiracy: Does the Obligation to
Disclose in Patent Applications Truly Help?, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143,
167-71 (2009) (discussing co-ownership and compulsory licensing); LAIRD &
KATE, supra note 25, at 61. But see Chen, supra note 15, at 20-22 (suggesting
that current trade secret and unfair competition law may protect traditional
knowledge, but that such protection is counter to the greater good).
30. HANSEN & VANFLEET, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that traditional
knowledge "may be considered de facto part of the prior art base" thus
precluding traditional knowledge subject matter from patentability).
31. Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 8(j) and 16(5), June 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 818, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. [hereinafter CBD] (Dec. 29, 1993); Erin
Kathleen Bender, North and South: The WTO, TRIPS, and the Scourge of
Biopiracy, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 281, 290-96 (2003). Additionally, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). But see SHIVA, supra
note 13, at 7-17 (arguing against the imposition of any intellectual property
rights on subject matter that includes living organisms or traditional knowledge
because IP rights stifle creativity).
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protection themselves. 32 Accordingly, many have argued for the
establishment of a sui generis system specifically to protect the
rights of communities endowed with extensive traditional
knowledge, communities who find no protection in the strict patent
statutes." Indeed, there are strong arguments for the necessity of
such a system. 34 Alternatively-and sometimes concurrentlyothers seek to find a way to use extant or slightly modified
intellectual property law to secure rights for indigenous
communities and ensure that "misappropriation" of traditional
knowledge ceases. 35
To that end, one proposed approach to including traditional
knowledge holders in the current system of protection requires,
inter alia, giving formal recognition of the contributions of
This
traditional knowledge holders to patented inventions."
approach may be affected through either of two strategies:37 first,
32. HANSEN & VANFLEET, supra note 8, at 5.
33. See generally Conference on Trade and Development Commonwealth
Secretariat Workshop on Elements of National Sui Generis Systems for the
Preservation, Protection and Promotion of Traditional Knowledge, Innovations
and Practices and Options for an International Framework, Geneva, Switz., Feb.
4-6, 2004, Draft Paper: Towards an International Framework for the
Protection of Traditional Group Knowledge and Practice, (preparedby Peter
Drahos); HANSEN & VANFLEET, supra note 8, at 26-28; Bratspies, supra note 9,
at 340 ("volumes have been written advocating some variation [of a sui generis
system]").
34. See Bratspies, supranote 9, at 333.
35. See Garcia, supra note 15, at 8 (citing the rejection of claims for the
Enola bean-a plant long cultivated in Mexico-by the USPTO following a
successful reexamination request by the International Center for Tropical
Agriculture); see also UNCTAD Disclosure Analysis, supra note 10, para. 35
(defining misappropriation as the consequence of biopiracy, of violating
authorized conditions of access, or of using the genetic resources to derive
unjustified or inequitably shared benefits).
36. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Technical Study on
Disclosure Requirements in Patent Systems Related to Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge, at 50, WIPO Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/7/INF/17 (Feb. 9,
2004) [hereinafter WIPO Technical Study] (stating that the failure to name the
true inventor could invalidate a patent under many national patent regimes and
suggesting that disclosure of the resource and knowledge is therefore required).
37. Sumathi Subbiah, Note, Reaping What They Sow: The Basmati Rice
Controversy and Strategiesfor Protecting TraditionalKnowledge, 27 B.C. INT'L
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the traditional knowledge holders may be recognized as legitimate
contributing inventors, entitled to appear named as such when a
patent issues; this may require altering the definition of
inventorship to accommodate communal inventions that develop
over time." Under a second strategy, patents may be rendered
unenforceable if they are based on subject matter developed using
traditional knowledge but fail to recognize the contributions of
traditional knowledge holders through adequate disclosure.39
Internationally, the latter approach has received more widespread
support.40 Indeed, some argue that such disclosure is already
required of patent applicants,4 1 and the Conference of the Parties
(COP) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has
recommended that states implement a disclosure requirement to
comply with the CBD.4 2 However, a traditional knowledge
disclosure requirement has never been explicitly articulated in
& COMP. L. REV. 529, 541-42 (2004).
38. See WIPO Technical Study, supra note 36, at 6; McManis, supra note 6, at
574.
39. WIPO Technical Study, supra note 36, para. 2 (stating that where the
traditional knowledge constitutes an inventive contribution to the claimed
invention the knowledge provider must be included as a joint or sole inventor,
but where the traditional knowledge does not meet this standard, the traditional
knowledge may have some use in assessing the patent's validity). According to
biodiverse/traditional-knowledge-rich countries, "in the case of inventions based
on biological resources and/or traditional knowledge related to the same, the
source of origin of the resources and details of the traditional knowledge, are
critical for ascertaining inventorship, that is, whether the applicant has
"invented" what s/he claims in the patent, or whether s/he has just found it in
nature or obtained it from traditional cultures." Id.
40. See de Carvalho, supra note 14, at 372 ("Instead of imposing [a
disclosure requirement] as a condition of patentability, which conflicts with the
TRIPS Agreement, WTO Members should make the enforceability of patent
rights dependent on compliance with the [disclosure requirement]."); UNCTAD
DisclosureAnalysis, supra note 10, at v; WIPO Technical Study, supra note 36,
at 1.
41. Biodiverse Nations' TK WIPO Submission, supra note 27, para. 6.
42. de Werra, supra note 29, at 152-55 (citing Bonn Guidelines on Access to
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out
of Their Utilization, Decision VI/24/A, Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 6th mtg., The Hague, UN Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (Apr. 7-9, 2002)).
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United States courts and, though President Clinton signed the
CBD, the convention was never ratified by Congress. 43
Despite the absence of clear binding precedent or international
law, one case decided by the Federal Circuit may provide modest
support for a requirement to disclose the contributions of
traditional knowledge, whether or not the contributions fall within
the bounds of existing inventorship law.44
45
ProtectionofInventions
B. Domestic or "Nationalistic"

1. Where Exclusive Rights May Exist
Patents can be issued to claim "anything under the sun that is
made by man. "46 Patentable subject matter does not include
abstract ideas, natural phenomena, or laws of nature.47
Furthermore, patents are barred for lack of novelty when certain
conditions are met.48 A printed publication describing or patenting
the invention, published either before the applicant's date of
invention or more than one year prior to the applicant's filing, will
destroy patentability. 49 If an invention was "known or used" in the
United States before it was invented by the applicant, a patent will
not issue." Similarly, a patent will not issue if the invention was
in public use or on sale in the United States more than one year
prior to the filing ofan application."
43. List of Parties to the CBD, http://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml
(last visited Sept. 4, 2010). Keeping the U.S. company as convention hold-outs
are the Vatican [Holy See] and Andorra.
44. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d 1315. PerSeptive IV held that, even though
actual inventorship was technically correct on an issued patent, the patent
applicants could still be held accountable for inequitable conduct for failing to
provide a full accounting of information about inventorship. Id. at 1317.
45. MGBEOJI, supra note 18, at 2 (stressing that aggressive nationalism
underlies the globalization of patent law).
46. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182, 185 (1981).
47. Id
48. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
49. Id § 102 (a)-(b).
50. Id § 102(a).
51. Id § 102(b).
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Traditional knowledge, even if it describes each and every claim
of a patent application, is highly unlikely to bar the issuance of a
patent on these grounds. Traditional knowledge is generally
passed down from generation to generation orally.52 Accordingly,
no printed publications exist.13 Moreover, the requirement that
prior knowledge, use, or sale of an invention be inside the United
States to defeat novelty on those grounds immediately
disadvantages all traditional knowledge holders who only utilize
their knowledge locally, save those traditional knowledge holders
indigenous to the United States.54
The obviousness inquiry, another means of rejecting a patent
application, also ignores traditional knowledge held outside of the
United States. Patents may only be issued for nonobvious
The invention is measured against prior art as
inventions."
defined above-printed publications from the world over could
render an invention obvious in the eyes of an examiner, as could
public use or sale in the United States.56 Here, as with novelty, the
use or oral description of an invention on foreign soil cannot
constitute prior art and, thus, cannot be used to show
obviousness."
Significantly, one statutory bar does not demand what one
commentator called "nationalistic" requirements to defeat
patentability." 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) has no territoriality restriction.
It simply prohibits patents issuing to an entity that "did not [it]self
invent the subject matter sought to be patented."5 9 Thus, an
invention consisting entirely of traditional knowledge acquired

52. Subbiah, supranote 37, at 545.
53. Id. However, there is a growing movement to change this fact by
compiling databases of traditional knowledge and allowing a small set of
people, namely patent examiners, to view the confidential databases in order to
determine if novelty is defeated. India has established such a regime, and other
nations are hoping to follow their lead.
54. 35 U.S.C. § 102.

55. Id. § 103.
56. See, e.g., Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
58. MGBEOJI, supranote 18, at 2.
59. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).
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from an indigenous community, no matter where that knowledge
originated or if it was recorded, cannot lawfully be the basis for a
patent in the United States.60 As simple as the rule sounds,
however, the strict requirements of inventorship, the technical
specificity of patent claims, and the nearly impossible task of
proving derivation from another's invention in court, make
reliance on this provision an unappealing option for traditional
knowledge holders seeking to assert their status as true inventors.'
2. The Statutory InventorshipInquiries
Many advocates for the rights of traditional knowledge holders
criticize the very concept of invention common to industrial
nations.62 In the United States, an invention is considered the
result of discrete individual efforts; only those identifiable sources
of distinct creative contributions are entitled to exclusive patent
rights as compensation for their extraordinary efforts. 63 Advances
achieved through traditional knowledge, in contrast, are the result
of communal efforts, slowly aggregated over time, without any
single protagonist or group of protagonists who could be named as
inventors on a patent application. 64
This basic schism is
considered by some commentators to severely handicap
developing nations at the outset in attempts to protect their
intellectual property rights. 65 Additionally, commentators note that
technical hurdles to showing inventorship, establishing joint
inventorship, or proving derivation make inventorship law
60. Id.
61. See Peruvian Biopiracy Experience, supra note 7, para. 1.
62. See, e.g., Bratspies, supra note 9, at 336-37 (suggesting that the
dichotomy between natural and invented underlying the patent system is false);
MGBEOJI, supra note 18, at 166 (faulting the industrialized nations' patent
systems for reliance upon the idea that inventions are created by individuals, as
opposed to communities).
63. MGBEOJI, supra note 18, at 166.
64. Cuno Eng'g Corp., 314 U.S. at 91; SHIvA, supra note 13, at 67; Chen,
supra note 15, at 21 (noting the traditional knowledge "rarely if ever satisfies"
the inventive step requirement of patentability).
65. HANSEN & VANFLEET, supra note 8, at 10; Bender, supra note 31, at 312-

13.
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practically inaccessible to traditional knowledge holders."
Criticisms as to the concept underlying the inventorship standard
aside, the legal standard in the United States has been clearly
articulated. An invention comes into being, allowing an inventor
to be determined, upon conception.6 7 Conception, the "touchstone
of invention," is a wholly mental act, defined as the completion of
the mental facet of inventing.68 No physical embodiment of the
invention is necessary.69 Rather, an invention requires only a
"definite and permanent idea" that could allow one skilled in the
art to understand and create the invention.70 Stated another way,
provided that there is a "formation in the mind of the inventor of a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative
invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice," there is a
cognizable invention."
Conception must envision the complete invention, including
how it is to be applied, and must encompass all limitations of the
claimed subject matter.7 2 Limitations are often very technical,
beyond the technical acumen common to developers of traditional
knowledge, even if the function and use of the invention is
identical to traditional practices." In effect, invention is thus a
66. Subbiah, supra note 37, at 5461 David Conforto, Traditional and
Modern-Day Biopiracy: Redefining the Biopiracy Debate, 19 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 357, 363-66 (2004).
67. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 124 F.3d 1429, 1434 (Fed Cir. 1997)
(finding an offer for sale sufficient to constitute an on-sale bar when the
invention had yet to be reduced to practice), aff'd, 525 U.S. 55 (1998),
70. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228.
71. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting 1 Robinson On Patents 532 (1890)).
72. Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Singh
v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
73. See Delegation of Peru, Patents Referring to Lepidium meyenii (Maca):
Responses of Peru, para. 46, WIPO Doc. GRTKF/IC/5/13 (2003) (stating that
maca had been used for treatment of fertility issues since its earliest cultivation).
Compare, for example, the alcoholic extract claimed in U.S. Patent No.
6,267,995 (filed Mar. 3, 1999), specifying a maca composition containing four
elements with quantities determined through chemical analysis with the
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mental activity that relies on specific scientific knowledge,
terminology, and quantification methods (especially in the
biotechnology fields) that may not be available in communities
that develop traditional knowledge.7 4 Moreover, conception may
not be baldly asserted by a putative inventor in order to have effect
in court-it must be corroborated by additional evidence."
While inventorship law does not recognize designations of an
entire community as an inventor, it does provide for designating
multiple individuals as joint inventors.76 The essential requirement
here is that each joint inventor contributes to the conception of the
invention." The contributions need not be equal, nor do the
designated joint inventors need to contribute to every claim of the
patent, nor must they work together on the invention at the same
place and time.78 With such flexibility, it comes as little surprise
that one court described deciding just who contributed to the
conception of an invention as an inquiry into "one of the muddiest
concepts in the muddy metaphysics of the patent law." 79 However,
traditional preparation of maca, which is made using a similar process but has
not been analyzed to accurately determine its component parts.
74. Subbiah, supra note 37, at 546. Although the courts have not held that
"the final size and shape of every part and the location of every nut, screw, and
bolt must be exactly foreseen before the conception of an apparatus can be said
to be complete," the person who conceived the invention must still be able to
make a disclosure to one of skill in the art that would enable him or her to
recreate the invention without extensive research or experimentation. In re
Tansel, 253 F.2d 241, 243 (C.C.P.A. 1958). Given that the courts have never
recognized traditional knowledge holders as a group of skilled artisans, it is
unlikely that a disclosure by one who conceived of an invention in traditional
knowledge terms would be capable of an enabling disclosure to a skilled artisan.
See Conforto, supra note 66, at 365.
75. Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
76. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006).
77. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF

PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

§ 2137.01 (8th ed., 7th rev., 2008) [hereinafter

MPEP]; see also Bd. of Educ. ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Fla. State Univ. v. Am.
Bioscience, Inc., 333 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Invention requires
conception.").
78. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006).
79. Sean B. Seymore, My Patent, Your Patent, or Our Patent? Inventorship
Disputes Within Academic Research Groups, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125,
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even in this muddy realm, conception is analyzed claim by claim.so
The inquiry into joint inventorship involves questions of law and
fact: while inventorship itself is a question of law, the underlying
basis for determining inventorship relies on questions of fact. "
Clear and convincing proof is necessary to modify inventorship.82
Thus, a finding of a contribution sufficient to support a claim of
joint inventorship will depend, largely, on the facts of a given case.
There are no bright lines, and the clearest positive guidance
available from the Federal Circuit suggests that co-inventors are
those who make contributions to conception that are "not
To define the standard negatively: neither
insignificant.""
suggesting an end result without indicating how to achieve that
end nor following the instructions of another who conceived an
invention is sufficient to establish joint inventorship.8 4 Moreover,
if an inventor maintains intellectual domination, ideas,
suggestions, and materials may be adopted from others."
The law provides a mechanism to correct a patent that does not
name the proper inventive entity when initially issued." If a
person is named or excluded in error, the patent may be corrected
to name the proper inventor(s), provided the error arose without
deceptive intent on the part of the inventor." The court's focus
when evaluating a petition to correct inventorship belongs on the
intent of the true inventor not named on the patent, as opposed to
the intent of the named inventors."
Finally, if the inventorship specified on a patent is completely in
error, that is to say, if the inventive entity named on the issued
135 (2006) (citing Mueller Brass v. Reading Indus., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1372
(E.D. Pa. 1972), afid, 487 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1973)).
80. See Bd of Trs. ofFla. State Univ., 333 F.3d at 1340.
81. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
82. Id.
83. Fina Oil & Chem. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
84. DONALD S. CHISUM, 1-2 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.02 [2][b]-[c](2010).
85. MPEP, supranote 77, § 2137.01.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2006).
87. Id.
88. Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1997). The lack of clarity on this point resulted in the improper application of
the law in PerSeptiveII.
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patent did not in fact invent the claimed subject matter, but rather
derived it from the true inventor, the patent may be invalidated."
Derivation requires two distinct showings: conception and
communication.90 Both must be proven with clear and convincing
evidence."
Conception must, as detailed above, include each
claimed limitation of the invention.9 2 If the evidence of conception
comes from the alleged true inventor, it must be corroborated by
Similarly, self-serving evidence of
additional evidence. 93
communication given by the alleged true inventor will not often
The court must be convinced that
stand on its own.94
communication of a disclosure of the invention sufficient to enable
one of skill in the art to practice the invention without undue
experimentation has occurred before finding derivation."
3. The Equity-Grounded "InequitableConduct" Doctrine
Inventorship issues extend beyond the statutory requirements: as
applied in PerSeptive III and IV and progeny-discussed in detail
below-inequitable conduct surrounding inventorship can also
play a key role in determining the viability of a patent." However,
here, as with much of the judicially-created inequitable conduct
law, the tests and analysis applied by courts are inconsistent." A
full discussion of inequitable conduct is beyond the scope of this
Note: scholarship and case law on the doctrine is vast; a review
article doing justice to the nuance, evolution, and inconsistencies

89. See Gambro Lundia, 110 F.3d at 1576.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Brown, 276 F.3d at 1336.
93. Gambro Lundia, 110 F.3d at 1576.
94. See, e.g., Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
95. Id. at 869-70.
96. PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d
69 (D. Mass. 1998) [hereinafter PerSeptive I], aff'd, 225 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2000); PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d 1315.
97. See Therasense, Inc. v Becton, Dickinson and Co., 374 Fed. Appx. 35
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (deciding to hear an appeal en banc to clarify inequitable
conduct standards).
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of judicial application is a Sisyphean endeavor." Nonetheless, an
acceptance of the historical mutability of the doctrine" coupled
with an understanding of considerations relevant to inequitable
conduct will suffice to evaluate both the options available to
biopiracy opponents and the application of the doctrine in
PerSeptive.
Inequitable conduct arises when a patent applicant breaches the
duty of candor she owes to the United States Patent and Trademark
Conduct must be proven by clear and
Office [USPTO].'"
convincing evidence."o' The duty of candor applies throughout
patent prosecution and, consequently, courts look to the entire
history of patent prosecution for instances of inequitable
conduct. 102 The inventor(s), along with each individual associated
with the filing of the patent, are saddled with the duty to disclose
information to the USPTO because the "[p]ublic interest is best
served . . . when . . . the Office is aware of and evaluates the

A
teachings of all information material to patentability."'
violation of the duty could include the misrepresentation of a
material fact, the failure to disclose material information, or the
submission of false material information.'04 Questions arise as to
the extent of disclosure required by the USPTO, which in turn
relies on a determination of the materiality of the piece of
98. 3 CHISUM, supra note 84, § 19.03 [introduction]. Chisum's treatment of
the subject alone fills over 350 PDF pages. Moreover, the doctrine is presently
under review en banc in Therasense. Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v.
Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 828, 835 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Rader, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that decisions on any less "egregious" allegations of
inequitable conduct be postponed until the en banc Therasense decision is
handed down).
99. 3 CHISUM, supranote 84, § 19.03.
100. Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d
1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
101. McKesson Info. Solutions v. Bridge Med., Inc, 487 F.3d 897, 913 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
102. Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Pres. Sys., Inc., 922 F.2d 801, 803 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("The duty of candor extends throughout the patent's entire
prosecution history. In determining inequitable conduct, a trial court may look
beyond the final claims to their antecedents.").
103. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1996).
104. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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information in question.' 5 This begs the question: what makes a
piece of information material?
i. Materiality
Courts use two basic tests as standards for determining
materiality.'06 The first standard, found in rules promulgated by
the USPTO prior to March 16, 1992, requires applicants to
disclose information if there is a "substantial likelihood that a
reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.""' In March
of 1992, the USPTO promulgated new rules, narrowing the scope
of materiality by defining a material reference as one that is not
cumulative and (1) establishes a prima facie case of unpatentability
or (2) refutes or is inconsistent with a position the applicant takes
in opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office
Although the broader
or asserting patentability of a claim.'
reasonable examiner standard is usually used to evaluate
allegations of inequitable conduct in patents prosecuted before
March of 1992, patents challenged since then have been subjected
to both tests, with no clear preference by the courts for either
one. 109

Applicants are required to file an oath declaring, inter alia, that
they believe themselves to be the "original and first inventor" of
the subject matter for which the application is filed."0 As a patent
cannot issue without this oath, the information contained therein
105. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
106. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1990) with 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1996).
In the past, the Federal Circuit has used additional tests, including the much
stricter "but for" standard. CHISUM, supra note 84, § 19.03[3].
107. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1990).
For an extensive discussion of the
108. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1996).
materiality standards, the courts' inconsistent use of the two tests, and differing
standards in inequitable conduct litigation generally, see Tom Brody, Duty to
Disclose: Dayco Products v. Total Containment, 7 J. MARSHALL REv. INTELL.
PROP. L. 325, 372-75 (2008).
109. Brody, supra note 108, at 372-75; see also Advanced Magnetic

Closures, 607 F.3d at 829.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
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has been defined as material."'
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure [MPEP] gives
additional advice on what to disclose, providing another barometer
of materiality, albeit a nonbinding one." 2 Included in the MPEP is
an admonition to applicant attorneys and agents to ask questions to
inventors about inventorship and, if any doubts surface, to raise
them to the patent office."' This reflects a well- accepted axiom of
disclosure requirements: if any information is on the border of
materiality, the applicant should always err on the side of safety by
disclosing it to the USPTO." 4
ii. Intent

A court reviewing inequitable conduct allegations must also
consider the state of mind of the party that withheld information
from the USPTO."' Inequitable conduct requires a culpable state
of mind-in other words, an intent to deceive the patent officerelated to the disclosure of a material piece of information."'
Direct evidence of an intent to deceive is rarely available, so courts
allow the inference of intent from the sum total of all
circumstances."'
This sum total analysis grants a court
considerable leeway, although mere negligence or errors in
judgment do not constitute culpable intent."' Moreover, evidence
of good faith must be considered to counteract evidence of bad

111. Stark, 119 F.3d at 1555-56.
112. MPEP, supra note 77, § 2004.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., LNP Eng'g Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 275 F.3d
1347, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting LaBounty Mfg. Inc. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); Critikon, 120 F.3d at
1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting the same).
115. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387,
1394-95 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
116. Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1439
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
117. See, e.g., Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1256.
118. N.V. Akzo v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1148, 1152
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
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faith intent."19
iii. Striking a Balance
Finding threshold levels of materiality and intent met, the court
must then balance the substance of those two inquiries.120 An
inequitable conduct finding renders all claims of a patent
unenforceable, a very severe penalty for a patent holder.12 '
Accordingly, the ideal application of the courts' balancing test will
only penalize those deserving of punishment: a relatively
unimportant piece of information withheld from the USPTO with
no real malice will not result in a finding of inequitable conduct.122
On the other hand, withholding a highly material reference without
a clear intent to deceive can be considered inequitable conduct,
just as a blatant attempt to mislead the USPTO by withholding a
piece of information of relatively low materiality can be
considered inequitable conduct.'23 Thus, with two vague threshold
requirements, one for determining materiality, one for determining
intent, and a balancing test to weigh the two, the court enjoys a
considerable amount of freedom in deciding inequitable conduct.'2 4
Additionally, in "exceptional cases" the court is empowered to
award reasonable attorney fees to parties prevailing on an
inequitable conduct defense.'
119. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (superseded by federal regulation 37 C.F.R. § 1.97, on other grounds, as
recognized in In re OxyContin Antitrust Litig., 530 F. Supp. 2d 554, 573 n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
120. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
121. Id.
122. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,
875 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
123. Cf Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (finding the failure to disclose a novelty-negating § 102(b) sale
insufficient for inequitable conduct where the applicants acted in good faith).
124. See Lisa A. Dolak, Beware the Inequitable Conduct Charge!, 91 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 558, 558 (2009) (discussing the court's recent
expansion of the inequitable conduct doctrine).
125. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006); Brasseler, U.S.A. I., L.P. v. Stryker Sales
Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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III. SUBJECT OPINION

A. Introductionto the Named Inventors and the Controversy
Synosys, later known as PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc., was
formed in the summer of 1987 by three scientists intent on
supplying an existing market.12 6 But Drs. Frank Regnier, Robert
Dean, and Noubar Afeyan quickly shifted the focus of their
enterprisel27 and, soon thereafter, patented a new method to
separate solutes that they coined "perfusive chromatography." 2 8
The patented process earned Dr. Regnier a publication in the
prestigious journal Nature.'29 Synosys launched the career of a
highly successful entrepreneur in Dr. Afeyan.'3 0 Dr. Dean proudly
points to his involvement with PerSeptive and HPLC among his
substantial list of accomplishments.' 1 However, roughly 200
pages of judicial opinion capped by a panel majority at the Federal
126. PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., No. 93-12237PBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *18 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 1997) [hereinafter
PerSeptive II] (suggesting their goal was to capitalize on the large molecule
separation market by supplying hardware and software), vacated in part,motion
denied, 12 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd, 225 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
127. Id. at *16 (noting a shift to high performance liquid chromatography
(HPLC) media).
128. Id. at *18 (discussing the company's "refocus"). The three patents were
derived from a single application and directed to a method for practicing
perfusive chromatography, a particle used for perfusive chromatography, and a
matrix of particles used for perfusive chromatography, respectively. PerSeptive
IV, 225 F.3d at 1317 (discussing U.S. Patent No. 5,019,270 (filed Oct. 9, 1990);
U.S. Patent No. 5,228,989 (filed Dec. 9, 1992); U.S. Patent No. 5,384,042 (filed
May 10, 1993)).
129. Fred E. Regnier, Perfusion Chromatography, 350 NATURE 634 (1991).
This article is just one of Dr. Regnier's 281 publications to date. See Fred
List,
Publication
Regnier
(last
http://www.chem.purdue.edu/people/faculty/PubList.asp?facultyid=56
visited Sept. 19, 2010).
130. Noubar Afeyan Biography, http://www.flagshipventures.com/team/
nafeyan.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
131. Robert C. Dean Biography, http://engineering.dartmouth.edu/faculty/
emeriti/robertdean.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
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Circuit ultimately rendered the perfusive chromatography patents
unenforceable for inequitable conduct because of these
distinguished scientists' behavior.13 2 Judge Newman, in dissent,
took an entirely different view of the facts by applying the rigorous

law of inventorship. 133
B. The Birth ofPerfusive Chromatography
Since 1977, Polymer Laboratories (PL) and its president, Fred
Warner, had been making material used to separate different sized
molecules through column chromatography.134 In 1985, Mary Ann
Rounds, a research assistant in the Purdue University lab of
prominent chromatography expert Regnier,"' asked PL about
providing column packing material.136 PL would supply the
material if Rounds and Regnier supplied information regarding the
material's performance. 1 7 Loose terms agreed upon, the parties
commenced a collaborative relationship.'
The collaboration
132. See PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., No. 9312337-PBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908 (D. Mass. January 9, 1996)
[hereinafter PerSeptive 1], motion denied, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600 (D.
Mass. Mar. 31, 1997), vacated in part, motion denied, 12 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.
Mass. 1998), af'd, 225 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000); PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 8600; PerSeptive III, 12 F. Supp. 2d 69; PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d
1315.
133. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1323-31 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Column
134. PerSeptive 1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *9.
chromatography requires packing a column with a specially created material,
tiny beads in the case of PL. The beads display different properties depending
on their inherent structure or any coating applied on the beads (in a process
known as derivitization). When a solute rich solvent is passed through the
particle packed column, different solutes exhibit different affinities to the beads
and pass through the column at different rates. Collecting the liquid that comes
out of the column in a series of fractions-- small quantities of liquid-- enables
scientists to separate unique solutes. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,019,270 (filed
Oct. 9, 1990).
135. Regnier Publication List, supra note 129 (citing many papers on
chromatography published by Dr. Regnier prior to the mid 1980's).
136. PerSeptiveI, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *10.
137. Id. at *10-12.
138. Id. Numerous documents used the word "collaborate," or some form
thereof, a fact that the district court makes abundantly clear through added
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began well: Rounds coated 300A and IoooA pore PL particles in a
process (known as "SAX") patented by Regnier and supplied her
results to PL, which commercialized the SAX particles and
subsequently visited Rounds to learn her coating technique.'
Strengthening their relationship, PL funded six months of SAX
coating research by Rounds and Regnier.14 0
A senior scientist at PL, Linda Lloyd, used SAX coating on a
class of particles with larger pores (4000 A) and compared them to

the Rounds-coated IOA pore particles. 41

Lloyd publicly

presented her comparisons twice in the fall of 1987 and, following
the second presentation, PL asked Regnier and Rounds to analyze
the larger SAX coated particles, 142 which PL supplied.143 Rounds'
analysis included the generation of two chromatograms in early
1988 that showed "spectacular" results, according to Regnier.114
Regnier immediately discussed these results with Afeyan and
Dean, prompting Dean to draft documents postulating perfusion
through the particles.145 As Regnier was conferring with his now
incorporated business partners and acquiring SEM images of the
PL particles,146 Rounds continued openly communicating with PL,

emphasis. Id. at *13-16, *20.
139. Id. at *13; PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1328-29. PL got a non exclusive
license to practice the patented process from Regnier. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *30.
140. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *30-31. This also
became a sore point between the two entities when PL had to cease funding
because of its small size. Id. at *32.
141. PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *14; PerSeptive II, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *33-34.
142. PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *14-16. Following this
request, Rounds drafted a research plan. Id. at *16.
143. Id.
144. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *41. Rounds described
the initial results, obtained in December of 1987, as "really good," "surprisingly
high capacity" of 4000A pore particles. PerSeptive 1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21908, at *16. She communicated these results to Lloyd at PL. Id. at *17.
145. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *46-47. The notes
openly asked about the presence of channels through the particles while the
subsequent memo declared that, assuming such channels exist, perfusion was
possible. Id at *48.
146. PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *21-22.
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informing PL that Regnier believed the great results could be the
result of "flow through" and sending them copies of the
"spectacular" chromatograms.' 47
In March of 1988, Synosys commenced "product development"
on 4000A pore particles and proposed an exclusive contract with
PL.148
Concurrently, Lloyd and Warner presented a paper
comparing the large and small pore SAX particles, citing
differences and explaining that the larger particles performed
better. 149 A few months later, Regnier presented on the same
particles (using the same chromatograms), but "crossed out" the
PL label.' Regnier called the particles "Poros" and suggested that
"Poros" was in the process of being patented.'' Following the
presentation, an alarmed Warner asked Afeyan if the particles
were, in fact, being patented-Afeyan replied in the negative.'5 2
However, Synosys did intend to patent the particles.' That fall,
Dean suggested to Synosys' patent council that Synosys, along
with PL, might be entitled to a patent on the structure of the
particles. 154 To Warner and PL, however, Afeyan disclosed that
the group was only taking steps to patent a particle coating.' By
the close of 1988 Regnier had written the disclosure that would
become the issued patents, therein stating that the necessary flow
and conditions for perfusive chromatography had never been
disclosed before.' 56
Unaware of the application in the works, PL continued its
dealings with Synosys and Rounds, supplying the particles used
147. PerSeptiveII, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *44-45.
148. PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *19-20.
149. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *45-46. Though Warner
did not know why: he thought it was due to surface area, and was dubious of
Regnier's perfusive explanation. Id. at *50.
150. Id. at *62-63.
151. Id. He also passed out abstracts. Id. at *111. Warner also followed up
the presentation with a letter, expressing his anger that PL wasn't given credit.
Id. at *67.
152. Id. at *64.
153. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *150-51.
154. Id. at *85-86.
155. Id. at *88-89. As opposed to the perfusive chromatography itself.
156. Id. at *92. The court found the June 1988 presentation to disclose just
such figures.
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for research; in March of 1989, PL agreed to a distribution deal
with Synosys and received a draft of a paper containing data from
both labs.'15 By that July, an application had been filed that named
Afeyan, Dean, and Regnier as the sole inventors of "perfusive
chromatography," and designated PL as but one source of useful
perfusive material fabricated in an effort "initiated" by Regnier
and pursuant to Regnier's suggestion that PL make particles with a
larger pore size.'
The patent examiner initially rejected the Synosys application on
prior art by PL, Rounds, and Regnier.159 In traversing the
rejection, the applicants argued disingenuously that two Lloyd
references were cumulative, and that a Rounds reference displayed
a flow rate slower than that claimed in the patent. 60 The alleged
inventors argued that their invention was created sometime
between June 22, 1988,161 and January 1st, 1989,162 and that prior
to that time, none of the inventors were aware of pores bisecting
the particles.16 3 In a declaration of inventorship that used Rounds
chromatograms from early 1988, dates redacted, as proof of
157. Id. at *79-80.
158. Id. at *93, *100-01.
159. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600 at *107. The original
application even attempted to ensnare particles produced exclusively by PL. Id.
at *102.
160. Id. at * 106-07. In fact, the Lloyd references disclosed different flow
rates, including one very high, and the Rounds reference disclosed a rate within
the claimed range. The applicants also failed to disclose a third Lloyd reference,
from March of 1988, that they were aware of and that disclosed figures used in
the actual application. Id. at *103-04.
161. Id. at *108. The date of Regnier's presentation on the "Poros" particle
that the examiner could have used as prior art. Id. at *63. Although Regnier
distributed abstracts and presented slides at the presentation, during prosecution
he explicitly stated that no such materials were distributed in what appeared to
be an effort to stem argument that the display served as prior art. The alleged
inventors also represented to the PTO that the presentation was not enabling, but
Regnier later admitted that the results could be reproduced by anyone within a
matter of hours. Id. at *116.
162. Id. at * 113. This date corresponds to when an article describing
Regnier's June 1988 presentation was published. Id at *142-43.
163. Id. at *108-09. Afeyan went so far as to say he didn't know about the
through pores until October. PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at
*23.
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reduction to practice, the alleged inventors further argued that not
one of them knew about particle flow through before June of
1988.164 In an attempt to diminish the contribution of PL, the
applicants argued that "some batches" of large pore SAX coated
PL particles displayed extraordinary separation results, but even
these inconsistent materials were not used in, or available to the
public prior to June, 1988-both arguments were false."' The
misrepresentations did not stop at the USPTO: Regnier assured
Purdue that he had never collaborated with PL and that the
perfusion patents were in a different field than his lab work at the
University.'6 6 Nonetheless, three patents pertaining to perfusion
chromatography were issued from the original invention disclosure
and patent application."

C. The District Court'sInitial Treatment of the Invention:
PerSeptiveI andH1
In PerSeptive I, PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. ["PerSeptive"],
brought an infringement suit against alleged infringers Pharmacia
Biotech, Inc., et al. ["Pharmacia"].' 68 PerSeptive was met with an
affirmative defense asserting that its patents were invalid for
failure to designate their true inventors.'69 The district judge sided
with the defense, finding clear and convincing evidence showing
that, at the very least, scientists from PL contributed to the
invention as co-inventors by practicing the invention and

164. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *114.
165. PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *24.
166. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *120. Of course, the
patents contained images created in his laboratory, on materials created by PL.
Regnier went on to suggest that reduction to practice occurred outside of
Purdue, and that performance of particles in the Purdue labs was inadequately
slow. Id. at *121-23.
167. PerSeptivelV,225 F.3d at 1317.
168. The suit was brought against defendants Pharmacia Biotech, Inc.,
Sepracor Inc., Pharmacia LBK Biotechnology AB, Pharmacia Biotech. and
Biosepra, Inc. by PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc., formerly Synosys, Inc., and the
Purdue Research Foundation. PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at
*1-3.
169. Id. at *3-4.
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collaboratively refining materials, even if they did not understand
However, the court
exactly why the invention functioned.'
recognized that the failure to name all proper inventors could be

corrected through 35 U.S.C. § 256, provided that the named
inventors did not act with deceptive intent in excluding the other
true inventors."' Declaring the record insufficient to determine
whether the named inventors acted deceptively in excluding the
others, the judge ordered a new trial to flesh out Afeyan, Dean, and
Regnier's intentions. 7 2 A finding of good faith, the judge ruled,
would allow the correction of a valid patent.'7 3
In PerSeptive II, the court laid out the facts regarding the named
inventor's behavior in an extended discussion, not once referring
to the claims of the three patents.' 74 Picking apart the behavior of
the applicants, the judge enumerated four fundamental failures in
honesty. First, the named inventors misrepresented the role of PL
to the USPTO by dismissing PL as a mere raw materials supplier'
that had produced 4000A pore SAX particles in an effort initiated
Even if PL scientists were not inventors, the court
by Regnier.'
reasoned, the duty of candor incumbent upon applicants required
them to disclose the exact relationship of the important
collaborators, allowing the examiner to make the ultimate legal
determination."' Second, the named inventors misrepresented the
timing of the invention: they were aware of particle flow-through
far earlier than they represented.' Moreover, the court stated that
170. Id. at *39-41. The court articulated the standard of conception as a
mental idea, but pointed out that the unnamed inventors obtained consistent
results and understood the functioning of the particles and further asserted that
merely stating a theory (as Regnier, Dean, and Afeyan apparently had) did not
qualify as an invention. Id. at *30-3 1.
171. Id. at *42. This articulation of the law was incorrect, as the Stark
decision, considered by the court in PerSeptive III, made clear. PerSeptive III,
12 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
172. PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *45.
173. Id. The court placed the burden of showing no deceptive intent on
PerSeptive. Id. at *45-46.
174. See PerSeptiveII, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600.
175. Id. at*139.
176. Id. at *142.
177. Id. at*141-42.
178. Id. at *142. The judge adds Regnier's assertion that the June, 1988,
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in furtherance of candor with the USPTO the dates of the
chromatograms submitted as evidence of reduction to practice
should not have been redacted.1 " Third, Regnier's assertions to
Purdue that the inventions were outside the scope of his laboratory
studies were either grossly negligent or outright lies.so And
finally, the statements made by Synosys members to PL about
their intent to pursue patent rights were deceptive."' This "pattern
of misrepresentations" by the applicants in pursuing their patents
prevented the court from finding that PerSeptive acted without
deceptive intent.182 Accordingly, PerSeptive's motion to correct
inventorship was denied.18 3
D. Making Use of an ErroneouslyPursuedIntent Inquiry:
PerSeptive III
Following issue of PerSeptive II, the Federal Circuit decided
Stark, therein ruling that the proper inquiry for correcting
inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256 was into the intent of the
unnamed true inventor.184 The district court reconvened the parties
in PerSeptive III in light of the new understanding of the law.1 5
The "unnamed true co-inventors," Warner and Lloyd, did not act
with deceptive intent, according to the court, so the patents were
correctable under § 256."6 Relying again on Stark, the court
turned its focus to the duty of candor the former applicants owed
to the USPTO, purportedly limiting that focus to representations
made regarding the collaborative nature of the inventions.'
presentation was not accompanied by paper abstracts or slides, to a list of
dishonest acts in this category. Id. at * 149.
179. Id. at *147.
180. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600 at * 150.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *156.

183. Id.
184. PerSeptive III, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71 (citing Stark, 119 F.3d at 1552).
185. PerSeptive III, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71.
186. Id. at 71. The court also noted that these inventors may be estopped
from asserting ownership interests in light of their failure to intervene in the
proceedings. Id.
187. Id.
Although the court also pointed out the four material
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The court laid out the elements of inequitable conductmateriality and intent to deceive'"-noting that "close cases
should be resolved by disclosure [to the USPTO], not unilaterally
by the applicant."' 89 Failing to name an inventor with deceptive
intent would constitute filing a false oath, and thus be material.' 90
Given the consistent course of misrepresentations concerning the
relationship between the named inventors and Warner and Lloyd,
the court found "clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent
on inventorship."l 9 ' The district court concluded that PerSeptive
had committed inequitable conduct because it failed to either
disclose these relationships or articulate a theory of joint
inventorship under § 116 that accounted for the exclusion of Lloyd
and Warner as named inventors.'9 2
However, the court's logical clarity dissipated when it refused to
entertain PerSeptive's request for a jury verdict on the proper
inventive entity'9 3 and asserted that the record bore enough
evidence to support the court's earlier determination of joint
inventorship by Warner and Lloyd under a summary judgment
standard.'94 Denying PerSeptive's request to introduce additional
evidence relating to any misrepresentations,19 ' the court stated that
the "basis of [its] conclusion that there was inequitable conduct
[was the court's] finding of a deliberate omission of a true

misrepresentations were made concerning the timing of the invention, it focused
its inequitable conduct inquiry on the omission of inventors because that issue
was substantially the same as that litigated in the § 256 hearing and, thus, would
not create any unfair surprise prejudicing the parties. Id. at 72.
188. Id. at 72 ("Inequitable conduct resides in the failure to disclose material
information with an intent to deceive or mislead the PTO" (quoting Critikon,
120 F.3d at 1257)).
189. PerSeptive III, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 73.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. The court assumed that the additional evidence PerSeptive intended to
introduce was related to misrepresentations because PerSeptive suggested, in
PerSeptive II, that it had evidence to show that the misrepresentations were not
material. PerSeptive III, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
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inventor," not misrepresentations. 9 6 Accordingly, the court found
in favor of Pharmacia on its inequitable conduct defense. 197
E. The FederalCircuit Weighs In: PerSeptive IV
A divided Federal Circuit affirmed the district court, albeit under
slightly different reasoning.198 Writing for the majority, Judge
Clevenger downplayed the importance of the district court's
holding that inventorship on the patents was incorrect, noting
instead that the "persistent course of material misrepresentations,
omissions and half truths to the PTO" concerning inventorship was
highly material.'9 9 "The district court specifically stated that the
PerSeptive I conclusion-that inventorship of the patents was
incorrect-was unnecessary to the inequitable conduct decision,"
"[F]alsehoods and omissions" were
Clevenger explained.20 0
designed to cloud the issue of inventorship, an essential condition
of patentability and examination.20 1
Although PerSeptive argued that by narrowing the claims during
prosecution to avoid reading on any contribution by Warner or
Lloyd it had cured any possible inventorship issues, the majority
found its arguments irrelevant.2 02 Correct inventorship upon
issuance does not make statements made during prosecution any
less material, the court reasoned, as the test for materiality does not
depend on what is correct, but rather what a "reasonable examiner"
would consider important.20 3 The majority would have the patent
196. Id. at 74.
197. Id.
198. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1317.
199. Id. at 1321 (citing PerSeptive III, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 73).
200. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1321. However, as discussed in the
preceding paragraph, the PerSeptive III court also held that the deliberate
omission of a true inventor, and not misrepresentations, was the basis for its
inequitable conduct ruling. 12 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
201. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1321 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(f); 35 U.S.C. §
116; MPEP, supra note 77, §§ 2004, 2137.01; and 37 C.F.R. § 1.56). This
assertion is disputed by the dissent, which noted that examiners must accept
inventorship as asserted by the applicants. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1330.
202. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1322.
203. Id. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that inventorship
is still material under the new PTO rule that states "information is material to
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examiner provided with an excess of information, allowing her to
make the critical inventorship determination.2 04 Additionally, the
court reasoned that intentional false statements may be material
even if independent of the claims, as the inquiry is focused not on
"inventorship per se, but misinformation about inventorship."20 5
Concluding that the district court made no clear error in finding
intentional falsehoods presented to the USPTO all directed
towards the issue of inventorship and, thus, did not abuse its
discretion in finding the patents unenforceable for inequitable
conduct, the Federal Circuit affirmed.20 6
F. A Different Take-Judge Newman's DissentingFocus on
Inventorship Law
In her vehement dissent, Judge Newman took issue with the
majority's failure to give due effect to the patented claims or
acknowledge the very definition of inventorship.207 Focusing her
analysis on inventorship as opposed to inequitable conduct,
Newman found no legally sanctionable behavior on the part of the
named inventors. 208 She explained that inventorship depends on
who conceived of an invention-who had a "definite and
permanent" idea, such that one skilled in the art could understand
the invention-not on who developed it or reduced it to practice.209
Likewise, she reasoned, legally cognizable contributions to
invention come from contributors who co-conceived of the subject

patentability when ... it refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant
takes in asserting an argument of patentability." Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. §
1.56(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (1999)). Yet the reasonable examiner standard still holds as
law today. See Advanced Magnetic Closures, 607 F.3d at 829.
204. Id. But see id at 1330 (Newman, J., dissenting) (explaining that an
examiner would not be permitted to make a rejection of the application on §
102(f) grounds on the facts of this case).
205. Id. at 1322. Judge Newman, in dissent, responded that inventorship is
determined based upon the claims, thus for any statement regarding inventorship
to be material, it must be related to the claims. Id. at 1324.
206. Id. at 1322-23.
207. Id. at 1324.
208. Id. at 1331.
209. PerSeptiveIV, 225 F.3d at 1324 (emphasis added).
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matter-mere collaboration on a project with a common end
would not constitute joint invention.210 Whereas Warner was on
record as rejecting the perfusion concept claimed in the patents,
named inventors Regnier, Afeyan, and Dean studied and
determined why the columns performed as they did.2 11 Newman
reasoned that this understanding, arrived at through scientific study
and reflected in the issued claims limitation that particles contain
pore sizes sufficient for perfusion chromatography, was the heart
of the invention because its disclosure would allow others to
practice the invention and obtain consistent results.2 12 The named
inventors alone were responsible for this conception and, thus,
were the only true inventors of the patented subject matter.213
Moreover, even if inventorship was incorrect, on Newman's view
of the facts 214 there was no inequitable conduct because "an error
in determining inventorship is not by itself inequitable conduct."215
IV. ANALYSIS
Though decided 10 years ago, a key rule of law from
210. Id. at 1324-25.
211. Id. at 1325.
212. Id. at 1327. However, the district court found evidence to suggest that
the inconsistency in results was not the fault of the particles, but rather problems
elsewhere in the column. Thus, PL could produce consistent results prior to the
patents' disclosure. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *72-73.
213. PerSeptiveIV, 225 F.3d at 1327.
214. Judge Newman found fault with each of the majority's specific instances
of misrepresentation. Id. at 1328. She reasoned that the patents' statement that
Regnier "initiated" particle production was correct, as his lab made the initial
contact with PL, but even if false, the statement was immaterial as PL, the
collaborators, played no part in the conception of the claimed invention. Id. at
1329. Similarly, none of the undisclosed prior art the majority and the district
court found indicative of inventive discovery related to the substance of the
claimed invention-perfusive chromatography. Id. In addition, Newman
reasoned that reporting on collaborative relationships and exchange of scientific
data to the USPTO is unnecessary when the collaboration and data exchange
don't reflect the claimed invention. Id. at 1329-30. Finally, Judge Newman
found the statement that PL was a source of raw materials to be true, not
misleading. Id. at 1330.
215. Id. at 1327 (quoting Pro-Mold and Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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PerSeptive-that full inventorship inquiry is not necessary for a
finding of inequitable conduct related to inventorship-is still used
today2 16 and may be of use to litigants opposing alleged biopirates.
Where the statutory requirements of inventorship law offered no
salient punitive options, the more-amenable-to-interpretation
inequitable conduct doctrine allowed the court to reach a "just"
result.217 Discussed below, Judge Newman's dissent, especially in
light of the extensive record at the district court, suggested that the
holding may not have stood for long and, consequently, would
offer no footing for biopiracy opponents. Alternatively, a reading
of the case marrying Judge Newman's inventorship-focused
dissent with the majority's inequitable conduct holding would
likewise provide little aid to those seeking to render patents
unenforceable if obtained with the unrecognized aid of traditional
knowledge. However, subsequent case law suggests that under
some sets of circumstances, including those posited below,
PerSeptive IV may provide some support for patent challengers.
This little bit of leeway, this thin area of gray, could provide
opponents of the inequitable practice of biopiracy the legal hook
they need when technical claim requirements and statutory
inventorship considerations are stacked so clearly against them.
Admittedly, the supports for a patent challenge that relies on an
inequitable conduct affirmative defense are shaky and present
large evidentiary and financial hurdles, but the very ambiguity in
the law lends credence to calls for a more formalized system of
disclosure requirements regarding traditional knowledge.

216. See, e.g., Advanced Magnetic Closures, 607 F.3d at 828, 832 (stating
that a determination of inventorship is not necessary for a finding of inequitable
conduct surrounding inventorship and citing PerSeptive IV as an instance of the
court finding patents unenforceable for the named inventors misrepresentation
of a relationship with others who might have been true inventors).
217. Antigone Kriss, Misrepresentationof Inventorship and the Inequitable
Conduct Defense: PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. PharmaciaBiotech, Inc., 12
FED. CIR. B.J. 285, 318 (2002).
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A. Interpretingthe Decision

1. As Establishinga BroadenedInventorship Inquiry
While inventorship depends on who actually conceived the
invention, disclosures surrounding inventorship should encompass
anything a reasonable patent examiner might find important in
determining who conceived of an invention.2 18 This formulation
casts a wider net and, in PerSeptive IV, did so without considering
the claimed invention of the issued patent.219 It is therefore unclear
how the PerSeptive IV majority determined just what was related
to invention. This blurry vision regarding the law of inventorship
allowed the court to make the correct equitable decision.2 20
Perhaps the key to this decision, derided by at least one
commentator for its logical failings regarding inventorship, is the
The applicants behaved dishonestly in
notion of equity.221
general.222 Perhaps the judiciary could not condone such behavior
with regard to the patent office223 or support an applicant lying to
collaborators,2 24 whether those collaborators contributed to the
invention or not. As Judge Newman noted in her dissent, behavior
unrelated to inventorship was not far beneath the surface in the
majority opinion.2 25 An extended recitation of facts detailing
218. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1321. This requirement could presumably
include product suppliers, collaborative partners, sources of knowledge, etc.
219. Id. at 1331 (Newman, J., dissenting).
220. Kriss, supra note 217, at 318. See also "Equity," "Equitable," THE LAW
DICTIONARY, (Anderson Publishing Co. 2002) (defining equity itself as
referring to "fairness," while equitable outcomes are described as "fair,
reasonable, or proper."). Indeed, historically, it was the courts of equity that had
the power to apply novel remedies to the cases brought before them. Equity is
also described as "the recourse to principles of justice to correct or supplement
the law as applied to particular circumstances."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 619

(9th ed. 2009).
221. Kriss, supra note 217, at 317-18.
222. PerSeptiveII, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *139-50.
223. Id. at * 133-42 (detailing dishonest behavior towards the USPTO).
224. Id. at *64 (Afeyan assuring PL that no patent application was under
preparation).
225. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1331 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that
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dishonest acts unrelated to the issue of inventorship may have
given both the district and appellate courts overwhelming
motivation to find against the patentees.22 6 Thus, it is unsurprising
that the court found a way to punish the dishonest applicants.227
Aid to opponents of biopiracy lies in this reading of the case:
though statutory inventorship requirements are stacked against
traditional knowledge holders, a court disinclined to reward the
dishonest behavior inherent in biopiracy may resort to PerSeptive
IV's broadened inventorship inequitable conduct inquiry to achieve
an equitable result.
2. As DecidedIncorrectly
However, it is difficult to dismiss assertions that the case was
incorrectly decided. On their face, Judge Newman's arguments
against the majority are thoughtful, well reasoned, logically sound,
and of no help to potential biopiracy opponents seeking an
inequitable conduct finding regarding inventorship.228 At least one
other commentator seems to agree that the case was incorrectly
decided, noting that the majority's holding runs counter to settled
inventorship inquiries and related disclosure requirements.22 9 As
Judge Newman articulated, inventorship depends on claims,
the majority's reference to an asserted commercial threat by PerSeptive against
PL is "unrelated to inventorship or inequitable conduct in the PTO").
226. See PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *133-51.
227. PerSeptiveIV, 225 F.3d at 1317.
228. Id. at 1323-31. It appears, however, that not all inequitable conduct
arguments would be foreclosed under Judge Newman's dissent. In PerSeptive
II, a key factor for the district court was the evidence of reduction to practice
obtained in January and February of 1988 by Rounds, which the named
inventors used to support a declaration that the invention was conceived five
months later. Although the district court pointed out that reduction to practice
does not precede conception, Judge Newman looked past this finding in
considering the propriety of inventorship as designated. A court, on remand,
may also have pointed to the named inventors' failure to disclose prior art
unrelated to inventorship, such as failing to mention the full invention disclosure
that occurred at the June 1988 meeting, or failing to inform examiner that slides
were present and abstracts handed out then, in finding the patent unenforceable
for inequitable conduct.
229. Kriss, supra note 217, at 317-18.
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specifically on who first conceived of a claimed invention.230
Inequitable conduct based on failure to invent would thus, per
Judge Newman's view, require an inquiry into who actually
conceived of claimed subject matter.23 1 Without recourse to a clear
inventorship disclosure standard, the decision could, as Newman
suggested, open up the door for a "plague" of essentially baseless
inequitable conduct allegations.23 2 As both the act of conception
and the technical nature of the claims are likely outside the
capacity of traditional knowledge holders, Judge Newman's
suggested inquiry would effectively eliminate the need to disclose
traditional knowledge contributions by restricting the scope of an
inventorship inquiry to the claims as issued. Moreover, the
seemingly contradictory statements from PerSeptive III (stating
that the inequitable conduct was based on the intentional omission
of a true inventor233) and the majority in PerSeptive IV
(characterizing the PerSeptive III court as relying on a series of
misrepresentations to find inequitable conduct 234 ) lend further
support to the notion that the case was decided in error.
3. As Focusing on the Timing of the Statements
Alternatively, the majority's inequitable conduct finding could
be reconciled with Judge Newman's inventorship inquiry by
considering the timing of the "misrepresentations" at issue. When
the maligned statements were made to the examiner, Lloyd and
Warner-creators and testers of the perfusive material-may have

230. PerSeptiveIV, 225 F.3d at 1324.
231. Id. at 1324-25. Judge Newman restricted her inequitable conduct
inquiry to inventorship issues in a manner congruent with the prejudice
arguments of PerSeptive. In order to avoid any prejudice arguments PerSeptive
might bring for its inability to introduce evidence not relevant to the § 256 issue,
the district court excluded some of the most culpable behavior by the named
inventors from playing an active role in the logic of its holding.
232. Id. at 1329 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The panel majority's requirement
that collaborative relationships must be reported to the PTO, whether or not any
collaborator is an inventor of what is claimed, is as incorrect as it is unworkable.
This ruling will outdistance any earlier 'plague' of attacks on patents.").
233. PerSeptiveIII, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
234. PerSeptiveIV, 225 F.3d at 1319-20.
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had some inventive right to the claims as they then existed. 3
Indeed, just making the argument that narrowing claims in
prosecution "cur[ed]" the problem with regard to inventorship
suggests that before the claims were narrowed there was a problem
with inventorship designation.2 3 6 Inequitable conduct may occur at
any point in the prosecution of the patent; an analysis of the
applicant's conduct with regard to the claimed invention, as it
exists at each point in time during the prosecution, seems
warranted.2 37 Accordingly, a rigorous inventorship inquiry into the
claims as filed, considering conception in light of each claim
limitation, may have revealed the culpable statements and
misrepresentations to be material even under Judge Newman's
standards.2 38 Had the majority articulated such an inquiry, the
decision may have received unanimous support from the Federal
Circuit panel, yet the potential value to biopiracy opponents would
have been eliminated.
4. Courts Applying the BroadenedInquiry
Subsequent case law reveals that the decision has been
interpreted as suggesting that the inquiry for inequitable conduct
regarding inventorship is broader than the inquiry for inventorship
itself.2 39 Indeed, the majority's failure to focus on claims was never
235. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *101 (claim 20, as filed,
read on the PL particles). The duty of candor applies throughout the patent
process. See, e.g., Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
236. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1322.
237. Molins PLC, 48 F.3d at 1182; 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
238. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1323-24. Without the limitation "suitable for
perfusion," there would be no need for co-inventors to understand the scientific
basis that Newman argues is so important to conception.
239. Id. at 1322 ("the issue is not inventorship per se, but misinformation
about inventorship"). See Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52592, * 19-20 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2010) (recognizing that the disclosure
of a saw was warranted to inform the examiner on inventorship even though the
disclosure would not have proven improper inventorship); Leviton Mfg. Co. v.
Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc., 606 F.3d 1353, 1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(finding a duty to disclose a patentee's earlier patent application which claimed
the same subject matter as a patent under prosecution, yet named a different set
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specifically repudiated and, contrary to Judge Newman's dire
warning, subsequent decisions citing the PerSeptive IV holding
show that the court's seemingly novel equitable power has not
been abused.240 PerSeptive IV has been applied very infrequently
and only, as in Advanced Magnetic Closures, when circumstances
clearly demonstrate inequitable behavior. 241' The PerSeptive IV
rule allows the court to find patents granted to dishonest applicants
unenforceable without going through the formal steps of inventive
inquiry.
In Advanced Magnetic Closures, PerSeptive IV was cited for the
of inventors and recognizing that, regardless of whether inventorship was
technically correct, the examiner had a right to inspect both applications to
assess inventorship because an issue of inventorship may still exist); Hypoxico,
Inc. v. Colo. Altitude Training, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67222, *44-46
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2008) (explicitly recognizing that inquiries into inventorship
under § 102(f) are not to be confused with inventorship disclosure requirements
in the context of an inequitable conduct inquiry). However, in some decisions
where inventorship was determined prior to analysis of inequitable conduct
claims, the finding of proper inventorship was relied on by the court in rejecting
claims for inequitable conduct for failure to disclose information material to
inventorship. See Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp.,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36127, *88-89 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2010) (finding
disclosure of an inventorship dispute "very unlikely" to be material when a jury
had rejected an improper inventorship claim on the same grounds); Sunbeam
Products, Inc. v. Wing Shing Products (BVI) Ltd., 311 B.R. 378, 398 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (stating that the failure to disclosure information related to an alleged coinventor could not be the basis for an inequitable conduct finding where another
court had already determined the individual not to be a co-inventor: "[s]ince the
Bankruptcy Court determined (and this Court affirmed) that Mr. Coffee was
not a joint inventor of the Patent, Sunbeam's first point could not be the basis for
finding inequitable conduct sufficient to deem the Patent unenforceable."
(citing PerSeptive IV at 1321.)), aff'd 153 Fed. Appx. 703 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bd.
of Trs. of Fla. State Univ., 333 F.3d at 1344 (finding that information regarding
the contributions of an individual determined by the court not to be an inventor
could not be material to any issue of patentability).
240. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1137-38
(E.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that one of many conversations with fellow scientists
regarding a patent's subject matter did not need to be disclosed to the examiner
to properly disclose information regarding inventorship).
241. Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., No. 98 Civ.
7766 (PAC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54615, *6, *27-30 (S.D.N.Y. July 17,
2008), affd 607 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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proposition that a determination of inventorship isn't necessary for
inventorship based inequitable conduct.242 Although the facts and
procedural history here differ from the PerSeptive decisions in
some key aspects,24 3 general misconduct by the applicant towards
the USPTO regarding inventorship once again obviated the need
for a specific finding of inventorship. 2" Again, as in PerSeptive,
the court saw no threat of prejudice in making an inequitable
conduct ruling involving inventorship without giving the parties a
chance to brief the inventorship issue as a standalone question.245
Thus, where the facts found by the district court generally detailed
dishonest behavior on the part of a patentee, the court again
asserted some freedom to make equitable determinations
surrounding inventorship without delving into a rigid claim
interpretation and conception discussion.24 6
B. PerSeptive Applied to Biopiracy
With the scene set by the INDECOPI pamphlet described in this
Note's introduction as a jumping off point, it is not hard to imagine

242. Advanced Magnetic Closures, 607 F.3d at 827-28.
243. Here, there was deposition evidence that the named inventor did not in
fact invent the subject matter claimed. Id. at 824. The district court here did
construe the patent claims, and questioned the alleged inventor about their
conception, only to find that he had no apparent familiarity with the conceived
subject matter. Advanced Magnetic Closures, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54615, at
*6, *27-30. "We believe that the district court's findings showing that Mr.
Bauer was not the true inventor support its finding of intent to deceive."
Advanced Magnetic Closures, 607 F.3d at 830.
244. Advanced Magnetic Closures, 607 F.3d at 830. The court enumerated
several specific findings concerning the named inventor's veracity in attempting
to assert his inventive act, noting specifically that he did not appear to
understand the science behind his alleged conception, that sketches submitted to
support his conception were later admitted to be reconstructions, and that he
gave "evasive, argumentative, and at times contradictory testimony on his status
as inventor." Id. at 830.
245. The parties had a chance to address inventorship in the context of an
inequitable conduct hearing for attorney's fees, and as indicated by their briefs,
they knew that inventorship was an issue. Id. at 827.
246. See PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1331 (Newman, J., dissenting). The
burdens of proof for inequitable conduct still apply.
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a situation analogous to PerSeptive or its progeny that would allow
a court, armed with PerSeptive and a strong sense of fairness, to
exercise its equitable powers to "respect"2 47 the contributions of
traditional knowledge holders.
1. A New Curefor the North
Juan, Maria, and the "gringo," Mike are in Juan and Maria's
Amazonian village, a community steeped in traditional knowledge
and endowed with a rich reserve of biodiversity. Juan guides Mike
to a small vine and explains that generations of his ancestors have
used the vine as a cure for stomachaches.2 48 Mike, an American
ethnobotanist who specializes in herbal remedies for stomach
problems, listens intently, paying close attention to the vine's
suggested use.249 Intrigued, he takes a sample back to the U.S.A.
to run some tests. Mike returns to the village a few months later,
having determined the major alkaloids of the vine, but seeing no
indication of significant pain relief in vine-ingestion animal
studies. After revealing his negative results to Juan, Mike learns
that the vine must be dried thoroughly in the sun, rinsed in water,
then macerated for a week in aguardiente-a strong alcohol used
by the native Amazonians-to unlock its healing properties.250
This knowledge, along with more samples of the vine, accompany
Mike back to his home country, where he converts the knowledge
247. CBD, supra note 31, art. 8(j), 1760 U.N.T.S. at 149. It is important to
note that a successful inequitable conduct suit can provide direct dignitary
respect, but only attenuated financialrespect. A finding of inequitable conduct
will render a patent unenforceable. This may deter prospective biopirates from
exploiting additional traditional knowledge, but it will not provide an
indigenous community with compensation for knowledge already exploited.
248. The community's history of preparation and use of the vine is analogous
to PL's history of developing particles suitable for column chromatography.
PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *9.
249. Like Dr. Regnier in PerSeptive, Mike is a noted expert in the field
relating to the patentable subject matter. Regnier Publication List, supra note
129.
250. PL, the resource provider, engaged in a similar open exchange of
information with Regnier, never suspecting that the result might ultimately
preclude it from doing whatever it pleased with the products it developed.
PerSeptive 11, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600 at *79-80.
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shared with him by Juan into a scientific procedure that comprises
dehydrating the vine, immersing it in water, then macerating the
plant material in 96 percent ethanol. 251' The resultant concentrated
extract does exhibit an effect in animal studies. Mike publishes
the results of his studies and announces his finding: a stomachache
cure previously unknown to herbal medicine. He neglects to
mention that the cure had been in use by Juan's community for
generations.25 2 Citing his personal publication along with a few
old articles from a journal of ethnobiology as prior art, Mike
applies for, and is granted, a patent on the vine extract containing
certain percentage ranges of the alkaloids he identified which is
useful to treat stomachaches.2 53
Back in the Amazon, Juan and Maria see a surge in demand for
their native vine. The vines, once valued primarily for their
medicinal properties, are harvested indiscriminately as locals rush
to capitalize on the plant's new cash value.254 Confused at first,
Juan and Maria soon learn the cause of their environmental flux:
with a patent securing his investment, Mike has poured resources
into both an operation to harvest mass amounts of the vine for
extraction and a marketing campaign extolling the virtues of the
Amazonian wonder vine.255 Mike and his new vertically integrated
enterprise monopolize the vine market-no other company can
legally produce the vine extract without infringing Mike's patent,
and Mike threatens suit on any company attempting to enter the

251. Similarly, Regnier, Dean, and Afeyan conducted tests on materials
supplied in good faith by PL, eventually elucidating properties unknown to PL.
PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21908, at *20-21.
252. Regnier's relabeling of PL particles as his own "Poros" technology is
analogous to this deceptive behavior. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8600 at *62-63.
253. Mike's failure to mention information gleaned from Juan parallels
Regnier's failure to cite PL publications that read on specific claims of the
perfusion chromatography patent applications. Id. at * 106-07.
254. The right to control resources in the interest of preserving biodiversity is
essential to an equitable system of intellectual property rights and, as described
here, is lacking under the current system. Bratspies, supra note 9, at 329.
255. Regnier similarly trumpeted his discovery of perfusion chromatography
in the hopes of creating a large market for the technology he would claim as his
own. PerSeptive II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8600, at *62-63.
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vine extract market.256
Juan and Maria are distressed-not only is their local resource
being depleted at an alarming rate,257 but they are also receiving
less than they might for the loss because of Mike's market
domination. 258 Determined not to let Mike exploit their resources
and knowledge without a fight, the two, with the support of their
community, start harvesting the vine themselves and selling its
extract to companies formed by Amazonians living in the United
States.259 Mike brings an infringement suit against the U.S.
companies offering the extract for sale and litigation ensues.260
2. A Dearth ofRemedies for the South
Assuming the companies buying vine extract from Juan and
Maria can find and afford adequate legal representation for a
patent dispute, they face generally bleak legal prospects. These
256. PerSeptive sought similar monopoly control, even with regard to
material produced by its own supplier, PL. PerSeptive I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21908, at *1-3.
257. SHIVA, supra note 13, at 72-77 (characterizing patents on biological
resources as consumptive of biodiversity).
258. See, e.g., Carlsen, supra note 27, at 85-86 (describing the effect of a
patent claiming the Enola bean, and a resultant royalty cost, on Mexican
producers of similar beans).
259. To even raise an inequitable conduct argument Juan and Maria face an
uphill battle. They cannot challenge the patent directly through the USPTO
because the USPTO only allows for reexamination based on prior art patents or
printed publications. 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(a) (2009). Even a single argument not
directed to claim validity in light of prior art patents or publications will
disqualify an otherwise valid reexamination request. MPEP, supra note 77, §
2205. Alternatively, Juan and Maria could not assert an inequitable conduct
charge based only on Mike's alleged improper dealings with the USPTO.
Inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense and, as such, can only be brought
after a party has been accused of infringement or in a declaratory judgment suit
where the threat of an infringement action is palpable enough to establish an
actual case or controversy. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118, 129 (2007).
260. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) ("whoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent").
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alleged infringers cannot argue that Mike's patent is invalid for
lack of novelty or obviousness: no printed publications describing
the vine, its preparation, and use existed-the Amazonian
community's knowledge was passed from generation to generation
orally.261 Arguing that Mike derived the invention from their
community is similarly futile: the patented extract consisted of
specific percentages of component nutrient parts that the
community had never even heard of, let alone quantified.
Moreover, even if a court found that the community had inherently
conceived of the patented invention, Juan would still have to prove
communication-his uncorroborated testimony, recounting the
communication to Mike in the middle of the forest, would not
likely serve as adequate proof 262
An unenforceability argument, however, is more likely to
succeed. Relying on PerSeptive IV, Juan and Maria's patrons can
argue that, just as Polymer Labs provided particles to Regnier, the
Amazonian community provided the vine to Mike. Mike and Juan
both sought to use the vine with a common end in mind, and they
engaged in a free exchange of information in achieving their
intended outcome, just as PL and Regnier both sought to use the
PL particles for efficient solute separation and shared information
regarding the same. Although the idea conceived of by Regnier,
Afeyan, and Dean was beyond the ken of PL, just as the
conception attributed to Mike in his patent was beyond the grasp
of Juan and Maria, an inquiry into the conception of a claimed
invention is unnecessary in an inequitable conduct action.263 Mike
disclosed the geographical source of the vine in order to satisfy the
patent statute's enablement requirement, but his failure to mention
the knowledge shared with him by Juan may give a court grounds
to find his otherwise unscrupulous behavior sanctionable under the
Mike's omission was "about
inequitable conduct doctrine.
inventorship;" arguably, a reasonable examiner would want to
know the exact relationship between Mike and his indigenous vine

261. Subbiah, supranote 37, at 545.
262. See Brand, 487 F.3d at 869-70.
263. PerSeptive IV, 225 F.3d at 1327 (Newman, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority's lack of attention to the claims).
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supplier.264
Admittedly, such an argument is thin gruel to sustain an
inequitable conduct charge.265 Mike's good faith belief that he had
no duty to disclose the contributions from Juan to his invention
may shelter him from an inequitable conduct finding. 266 And yet,
Juan, Maria, and their buyers would seem to have no other options
under the patent law. They would be forced to rely on the court's
sympathies to their plight, in association with its broad equitable
power under PerSeptive, in achieving a legally supportable
inequitable conduct defense and, consequently, a "just" outcome to
their case. 261
C. An Opportunityfor Progress

1. Steadying the Inequitable ConductDoctrine
As beneficent as a ruling protecting the rights of the Amazonian
community might be, in the above hypothetical the disclosure
requirements and final disposition are far from certain. Yet, such

264. Id. at 1322 ("the issue is not inventorship per se, but misinformation
about inventorship").
265. Without positing an unlikely set of egregious and unnecessary
misrepresentations to the USPTO on behalf of Mike-for example, stipulating
an invention disclosure that details how the patented subject matter reached
Mike's consciousness through a series of dreams-a consistent pattern of
misrepresentation, like that found in PerSeptive, is lacking. Indeed, without
printed prior art asserted by an examiner, and arguments to overcome the same
by the applicant, there would not likely be an opportunity to establish any
pattern of behavior, good or bad. This would make the requisite showing of
intent, inferred from all circumstances, very hard to achieve. See Exergen Corp.
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326-29 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (establishing
heightened pleading standards in inequitable conduct, including the requirement
that intent to deceive the patent office is the "single most reasonable inference
able to be drawn from the evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard of
proof' (citing Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365)).
266. See M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., 439 F.3d
1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that the absence of a good faith belief that a
reference was immaterial was not sufficient to infer an intent to deceive).
267. Kriss, supra note 217, at 317-18.
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uncertainty in the applicability of a legal requirement is contrary to
the basic rule of law-laws are to be clear and predictable.268
Implementing specific disclosure requirements would provide
clarity in traditional knowledge patents, stem possible charges of
inequitable conduct when patents are not obtained from traditional
knowledge,2 69 and still allow courts to maintain their powers of
equity when statutory inventorship law would reward
unscrupulous applicants. Judge Newman vigorously protested the
potential application of the PerSeptive IV majority holding on the
grounds of certainty, lamenting that requiring a broad disclosure of
collaborators or inventive issues not necessarily related to claims
would outstrip any prior inequitable conduct ruling in expanding
the scope of who could claim the doctrine.2 70 One commentator
shared Newman's pessimism about inventorship designation in
basic research settings: considering an interconnected research
environment, PerSeptive IV offered little guidance as to where one
could safely draw a line separating material collaborators, whose
efforts should be disclosed as having a bearing on inventorship,
from those who need not be discussed in a disclosure.27 ' Other
commentators bemoaned unclear disclosure requirements as well:
just what is required to be disclosed, and don't limitless disclosure
requirements create a heavy burden on the patent examiner, forced
to wade through all the disclosed material in a limited time
frame?272
Rather than leave this area of law gray, however, specific
guidance could be provided to aid all parties involved: clearer
standards could allow patent applicants to disclose the proper
268. See Thomas Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66

CAMBRIDGE

L.J. 67, 69-71

(2007).
269. UNCTAD DisclosureAnalysis, supranote 10, para. 58.
270. PerSeptive IV 225 F.3d at 1329 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The panel
majority's requirement that collaborative relationships must be reported to the
PTO, whether or not any collaborator is an inventor of what is claimed, is as
incorrect as it is unworkable. This ruling will outdistance any earlier "plague"
of attacks on patents.").
271. Kriss, supra note 217, at 329.
272. E.g. Dolak, supra note 124, at 567; Kriss, supra note 217, at 329
(stating that disclosures could prove to be an unreasonable burden on applicants
and examiners).
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information, with less fear of possible inequitable conduct
unenforceability, while simultaneously giving patent challengers a
better gauge of their chances in challenging an issued patent.273
Because inequitable conduct law is currently under review,274
providing clarification of inequitable conduct inventorship
disclosure requirements would not disrupt a well-settled doctrine.
In clarifying, the courts or the USPTO could bring the U.S. up to
speed with international law without imposing a substantial burden
on the patent prosecution process in the United States.275
Simultaneously, formal clarification has the potential to prevent
the issuance of bad patents. 276 Requiring a patent applicant seeking
to claim subject matter related to genetic resources or traditional
knowledge known or used in another country to fully disclose the
origin of the material and extant traditional knowledge would
begin to bring the United States into line with the suggestions of
the Bonn guidelines interpreting the requirements of the CBD.277
This change could ultimately result in fewer legal instances of
intellectual property misappropriation from developing nations.
2. PerSeptive as a Launching Pointfor InternationalAccord
There is broad support for this disclosure requirement to be
found in international treaties, international organizations, and

273. UNCTAD DisclosureAnalysis, supra note 10, para. 58.
274. See Advanced Magnetic Closures, 607 F.3d at 835 (Rader, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that additional inequitable conduct cases be decided
after the court clarifies the doctrine in the en banc Therasense appeal).
275. The patent examiner would still be required to assume the inventorship
is correct as declared in the inventorship oath, thus adding little more burden
than a filing burden to the patent prosecution. MPEP, supra note 77, §§
2137.01, 706.02(g). But see de Carvalho, supra note 14, at 391 (noting the
United States argument that disclosure requirements would increase the cost of
record keeping resulting in an increased cost of production).
276. Kuruk, supra note 7, at 680. Given the tremendous financial burden of
litigating the enforceability of an issued patent and biopiracy opponents' very
limited financial means, firm guidance from the federal courts resulting from a
biopiracy related judgment is highly unlikely. Rules promulgated by the
USPTO provide a better arena for establishing specific disclosure requirements.
277. See de Werra, supra note 29, at 152-55.
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scholarly literature.2 78 The CBD, finalized in 1992, attempts to
address some of the concerns of developing biodiverse nations
about exploitation by the industrialized powers.279 Specifically, the
CBD seeks to precipitate an international legal regime that
acknowledges the inventive contributions of indigenous
communities and allows all global citizens to benefit from genetic
resources and traditional knowledge in a fair and equitable
manner.28 o Towards that end, in the Bonn Guidelines, the Parties
to the Convention recommended implementing national legislation
that encourages disclosure of traditional knowledge when "the
subject matter of the application concerns or makes use of
[traditional] knowledge in its development." 281
In light of the CBD, the World Intellectual Property
Organization [WIPO] issued a detailed technical study on
disclosure requirements and traditional knowledge that found
inventorship disclosures detailing traditional knowledge
contributions warranted in instances where the knowledge: (1)
provided part of the descriptive background of an invention, (2)
constituted material prior art, (3) directly contributed to the

278. See id (suggesting that a duty to disclose is advocated widely and
arguing that it is insufficient to adequately protect traditional knowledge
holders' rights); Fritz Dolder, Improving the Legal Position of Stakeholders of
Bioresources in the Statutory Law of developed industrialCountries, translated
from "Patente auf der Grundlage biologischer Ressourcen aus
Entwicklungsldndern," 8/9 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN PATENTANWALTE
349-72 (2003); Biodiverse Nations TK WIPO Submission, supra note 27, PARA.
1.
279. Conforto, supra note 66, at 379-84.
280. CBD, supra note 31. Article 8(j) encourages the use and sharing of
traditional knowledge, while at the same time recognizing the need to protect
that knowledge and to ensure that any benefits derived from its utilization are
shared with the traditional knowledge holders. Article 15(1) recognizes a
sovereign right of nations to determine who accesses their genetic resources,
defined as resources with functional units of heredity. Article 15 further calls
for parties to obtain informed consent from genetic resource providers (15(5))
and to take measures to ensure that any benefits realized through the
commercialization of genetic resources are shared equitably with the resource
provider (15(7)). Additionally, Article 16(5) obliges contracting states to ensure
that their intellectual property laws and procedures support the CBD.
281. WIPO Technical Study, supra note 36, at 35.
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inventive concept, and (4) constituted a component of the
inventive concept itself.282 Additionally, WIPO recognized that a
duty to disclose such traditional knowledge contributions may be
inherent in extant patent law regimes.28 However, the CBD alone
is virtually unenforceable, relying instead on member states
implementing national legislation to give effect to the convention's
provisions.2 8 4 Furthermore, despite a presence throughout the
282. Id. at 37. The report described these possibilities in four examples:
TK [traditional knowledge] may be relevant to the inventive concept in several
ways:
- the TK may have pointed the way in a very general sense to the line of
research that in turn led to the
invention (e.g. traditional knowledge that a certain plant could be used to make
a pleasant tasting
beverage, which led researchers to investigate medicinal properties of the plant);
- the TK may have provided a more direct pointer to the invention (e.g.
traditional knowledge that a plant
has certain medicinal properties may lead researchers to explore other possible
medicinal properties of
active compounds in the plant);
- the TK may have directly contributed to the inventive concept (e.g. traditional
knowledge that a certain
plant extract was effective in treating skin infections may have led researchers
to conclude that active
compounds in the plant were effective antibiotics);
- the TK may be a component of the inventive concept itself (e.g. a traditional
knowledge holder may
have communicated to a researcher a new or undisclosed medicinal property of
a plant extract, when
this property is central to the invention as claimed).
283. Id. ("Further elaboration may be necessary to determine their range of
operation and their relationship with patent law and the intemational patent
system").
284. See United Nations Environment Program [UNEP], Manual on
Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements,
at 289 U.N. Doc. No. DC/0817/NA (2006) (encouraging strong national
enforcement of laws implementing the CBD); Conforto, supra note 66, at 381
(suggesting the difficulty in enforcing the CBD). Some countries have given
effect to the CBD's provisions. For example, Peru, enacted law No. 27811 to
establish a "Protection Regime of Indigenous Peoples' Collective Knowledge
Relating to Biological Resources." Ley No. 27811, supra note 26. Similarly,
the Commission of the Andean Community adopted Decision 391, Regimen
Comin sobre Acceso a los Recursos Gen6ticos [Common Regime on Access to
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treaty's negotiations, the U.S. has not ratified the CBD and, thus,
is under not under a legal obligation to implement its provisions.285
It is also important to note that mere disclosures of traditional
knowledge contributions to patented subject matter are not
sufficient to meet the goals of the Convention.286 Although a
traditional knowledge disclosure requirement may serve to
"respect" the contributions of traditional knowledge holders,
additional requirements, including prior informed consent by
communities and equitable benefit sharing agreements between
patentees and indigenous resource providers, are the mechanisms
most likely to generate economic benefits.28 7
3. Institutinga Formal TraditionalKnowledge Disclosure
Requirement
Full and fair disclosures will still allow examiners to assume
inventorship as sworn in an oath, but at the same time will
facilitate prior art searches, including searches of traditional
The
knowledge databases currently under construction.288
disclosure requirements could also include an automatic
notification sent to the country of origin of genetic resources or
traditional knowledge, though without a pre or post grant
opposition procedure to challenge a suspicious patent,28 9
Genetic Resources] on July 2, 1996 to implement provisions of the CBD,
available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/d391e.htm.
China recently passed provisions to implement portions of the CBD as well.
Margo A. Bagley, The New Invention Creation Activity Boundary in Patent
Law, 51 WM. &MARY L. REv. 577, 586 (2009).
285. List of Parties to the CBD, supra note 43. However, as a signatory to
the treaty, the U.S. is under an obligation not to act inconsistent with the treaty's
purpose. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
286. CBD, supra note 31, art. 8(j).
287. Id.
288. India, for example, has undertaken to catalog its traditional knowledge
in a single database, accessible to patent examiners throughout the world.
HANSEN AND VANFLEET, supra note 8, at 15-18.

289. Challengers in opposition proceedings, unlike Federal Court patent
litigants, do not need to show an actual case or controversy to voice their
arguments. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European
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notification would be of less value in the United States than in
The requirements could reduce
other patent regimes.29 0
uncertainties, make national laws more coherent, prevent
misappropriation, assist in identifying suspicious situations and
facilitating corrective actions, and aid in substantive patent
review."' Obviously, if Mike's patent application had included a
full description of the knowledge provided to Mike by Juan and
the Amazonian community, there would be no concealment to
point to in an inequitable conduct allegation.
Exactly how inequitable conduct litigation (based on a failure to
disclose all potentially relevant inventorship information) meshes
with other current disclosure enforcement proposals is the subject
of debate.2 92 The lack of disclosure could serve to prevent a patent
from issuing, or it could be asserted as an additional element of an
applicant's overall duty of disclosure, with enforcement coming
Several international
only through subsequent litigation.2 93
intellectual property commentators have suggested that
enforcement of a formal disclosure requirement is best conducted
in arguments similar to Pharmacia's unenforceability affirmative
defense.294 Thus, PerSeptive IV-based arguments seem to align
with general international opinion.
Nonetheless, the United States still vigorously opposes such a
formal requirement, suggesting that it adds to the burden of patent
applicants and examiners and adds uncertainty to the patent
process.2 95 Predictably, biodiverse countries disagree.296 They
Patent Convention) art. 99, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, Art. 99, 1065 U.N.T.S.
254 (amended in 2000).
290. Id. (providing for a nine month post grant opposition period).
291. UNCTAD DisclosureAnalysis, supra note 10, at iv-v.
292. Id. paras. 4-5. Interestingly, many proposals include a required showing
of an intent to deceive.
293. de Carvalho, supra note 14, at 372.
294. Id. at 372, 399 ("courts should be able to sanction the lack of candor of
patent applicants who knowingly failed to disclose the source in a manner that
would facilitate benefit sharing, as established by article 15 of the CBD").
295. Submission by United States to the WTO, Article 27.3(B), Relationship
Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protectionof Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/434, paras. 14-15 (Nov. 24,
2004).
296. Submission by Brazil and India to the WTO, Article 27.3(B),
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argue that a clear requirement to disclose, inter alia, traditional
knowledge used in creating patentable subject matter would add
certainty to the disclosure requirements.297 As PerSeptive IV
suggests, the disclosure requirements are already unclear; formal
clarification could only serve to enhance patent certainty.
Moreover, the biodiverse nations' assertion that imposing
requirements does not add any significant administrative burden298
is entirely reasonable when the patent applicant is already in
possession of information regarding the source of traditional
knowledge.299
Though it will not allow traditional knowledge holders to exert
full control over their resources and knowledge at the outset,
creating a formal duty to disclose traditional knowledge
contributions may deter potential biopirates from misappropriating
or failing to respect indigenous knowledge and could give
biopiracy litigators an incentive to pursue cases. Currently there is
a paucity of litigation brought by developing countries for one key
reason: cost.300 Patent suits are prohibitively expensive for
developing nations to litigate.30 ' Inequitable conduct allows for the
awarding of attorney's fees to the victor in exceptional cases, if
culpability is severe enough.302
With a clear disclosure
requirement, parties willfully choosing not to disclose
contributions of traditional knowledge are more likely to fall into
that "exceptional" category, thereby warranting an award of
attorney's fees against them.
Thus, monetarily motivated
inequitable conduct litigation, or fear thereof, could provide a
potential enforcement mechanism or create an incentive for the
knowledge appropriator to comply with the disclosure
requirements.
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Observations on issues raised in a
communication by the United States, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/443, para. 18 (Mar. 18,
2005).
297. Id. para. 8.
298. Biodiverse Nations' TK WIPO Submission, supra note 27, para. 12.
299. See UNCTAD Disclosure Analysis, supranote 10, para. 28.
300. See de Werra, supra note 29, at 157.
301. Id.
302. 35 U.S.C. § 285; Brasseler,267 F.3d at 1380.
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Admittedly, even this step forward will not go directly towards
the ultimate goal of adequately reimbursing the inventive
communities.303 PerSeptive IV calls merely for recognition of the
inventive contributions of indigenous communities, without any
requirement for showing the communities' informed consent of the
use of its resources or any benefit sharing arrangement.304
Moreover, as discussed in detail by other commentators, a shift in
approach from punitive measures to a "proactive approach aimed
at ensuring that communities will truly benefit" is undoubtedly
preferable to uncertain unenforceability litigation.30 Yet, given
extant domestic opposition even to formal changes in disclosure
requirements, such grand proactive aspirations remain on the
distant horizon.
V. CONCLUSION

As long as the odds may be, the broad duty to disclose
information about inventorship established by the PerSeptive IV
majority-a duty imposed without regard to the issued patent
claims and irrespective of their actual inventorship-still offers a
potential litigation strategy for biopiracy opponents. A formal
duty to disclose traditional knowledge, supported by much of the
world, or a sui generis system designed to respect and reward the
inventive contributions of traditional knowledge would
undoubtedly serve the interests of traditional knowledge holders
more effectively. However, in the United States, in the face of
high statutory hurdles and continued resistance to binding
international reform, traditional knowledge holders demanding
respect under the patent law for their inventive contributions have
the little else to go on.
As we have been told, "you go to war with the army you have ...
not the army you might want, or wish to have at a later time."306
For biopiracy opponents seeking inventorship respect for
de Werra, supranote 29, at 156.
See Biodiverse Nations' TK WTO Submission, supra note 27, para. 1.
de Werra, supranote 29, at 159.
Thomas E. Ricks, Rumsfeld Gets Earful From Troops, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 9, 2004, at AO1 (quoting Donald Rumsfeld).
303.
304.
305.
306.
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traditional knowledge, the armor provided by PerSeptive IV is the
best protection around.
Trevor J. Clarke
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